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Abstract The concept of power asymmetry is incorporated into the framework of the Graph Model for
Conflict Resolution (GMCR) and then applied to a water pollution dispute in China in order to show how it
can provide strategic insights into courses of action. In a new definition of power asymmetry, one of the
decision makers (DMs) in a conflict can influence the preferences of other DMs by taking advantage of addi-
tional options reflecting the particular DM’s more powerful position. The more powerful DM may have three
different kinds of power: direct positive, direct negative, or indirect. It is useful to analyze a model of a con-
flict without power asymmetry, and then to analyze a power-asymmetric model. As demonstrated by analy-
sis of the water quality controversy that took place at the border separating the Chinese provinces of
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, this novel conflict resolution methodology can be readily applied to real-world strate-
gic conflicts to gain an enhanced understanding of the effects of asymmetric power.
1. Introduction
With population growth and economic development, water resources crises have become a global phe-
nomenon. Water resources issues arise at the international level (the Nile Basin [Dinar and Alemu, 2000; Wu
and Whittington, 2006; Elimam et al., 2008], the Ganges [Kilgour and Dinar, 2001], the Indus River [Zawahri,
2008, 2009a], the Zambezi River basin [Tilmant et al., 2010; Tilmant and Kinzelbach, 2012; Giuliani and Castel-
letti, 2013], the Caspian Sea [Madani and Gholizadeh, 2011; Madani et al., 2014], the Middle East [Hipel et al.,
2014], the trans-border Canada-US basins [Hipel and Fraser, 1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1980; Ma et al., 2011,
2013], and the Aral Sea Basin [Nandalal and Hipel, 2007]) and at the regional level (the Maipo River Basin
[Cai et al., 2003], Zayandeh-Rud River Basin [Madani and Mari~no, 2009], the Upper Klamath Basin [Boehlert
and Jaeger, 2010], California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta [Madani and Lund, 2011a, 2011b], and water
diversions in China [He et al., 2014; Chu et al., 2015]). Generally, water resources conflicts reflect different
needs for water quantity or quality or navigation across different stakeholders, and different economic or
temporal demands in meeting these needs. Water conflicts are also shaped by history, political leverage,
perceptions of need, broader conflicts, and other connected issues. Water resources disputes seriously
restrict sustainable development and efficient utilization of limited water resources. On the other hand,
based on a study of 261 international rivers, Wolf [1998] concludes that water is an agent for peace and
cooperation rather than hostile conflicts and war. For instance, although attempts by international corpora-
tions to assume control over water supply and treatment, as well as other infrastructure systems, in coun-
tries around the globe have caused serious conflict to arise [Hipel and Obeidi, 2005], various versions of
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which take advantage of the private sector for economic efficiency and
the public sector for longer-term vision in water management, have been adopted as a compromise
approach [Kassab et al., 2011].
Various quantitative and qualitative conflict resolution methods have been developed for water resources
management. Among them, a very rich body of analytical techniques deal with treaties, conflict, and coop-
eration over international rivers [Gleditsch et al., 2006; Zawahri et al., 2010, 2011; Zawahri and Mitchell, 2011;
Dinar et al., 2011; Brochmann and Hensel, 2009, 2011; Brochmann, 2012]. For a description of various
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economic, statistical, and game-theoretical approaches for studying transboundary water conflict and coop-
eration, see Dinar and Dinar [2003] and Dinar [2004]. In particular, water resources conflict resolution
research has been carried out in a game-theoretic framework because game methods can provide a better
understanding of the trade-offs inherent in water resources management, such as sustainability versus effi-
ciency. The objective is to more effectively manage water resources, in strategic and positive ways [Madani,
2010; Madani and Hipel, 2011].
A water resources system has many attributes including ecology and effects on nature, society, and the
economy, so water resources conflicts are highly complex strategic decision problems—multigoal, multista-
keholder, multistage, and multilevel. They are usually settled through negotiations. As a simple, flexible, and
practical conflict analysis methodology, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) [Kilgour et al., 1987;
Fang et al., 1993] can model and analyze water resources conflicts well. Specifically, using GMCR the devel-
opment or evolution of a water resources conflict can be simulated through dynamically tracking the possi-
ble moves and countermoves of decision makers (DMs) among different states (outcomes) in the conflict.
Then the possible stable states (equilibria or resolutions) of the conflict can be identified, and appropriate
strategic guidance can be provided to the DMs in the conflict.
GMCR can solve strategic conflicts in the form of strategic interactions modeled on a directed graph. Kilgour
and Hipel [2005] characterize a strategic conflict as an interaction of two or more independent DMs, each of
whom makes choices that together determine how the state of the conflict evolves, and each of whom has
preferences over these possible states (as eventual resolutions). It is clear that strategic conflicts are very
common in interactions in all fields, including water resources management. The interest groups in a strate-
gic conflict are modeled as DMs (decision makers), where each DM can unilaterally make choices (also
known as strategies or options). The combination of choices of all DMs together determines the state
(potential outcome) of the conflict. Generally, DMs’ interests and objectives clash, as reflected by their pref-
erences over the states [Getirana and Malta, 2010].
Stability in a graph model is based on the idea of moves and countermoves by the DMs. This idea of stabil-
ity is strategic, and contrasts with that of determining equilibria by maximizing expected utility, even using
a minimax concept as is often done in the normal form [Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944], especially
for two-person zerosum games. In a graph model, a DM may choose to move or stay at any initial state; the
order of moves is immaterial. Another constraint that may limit the verisimilitude of a normal-form game
model is that in a game players’ preferences must be represented by real-valued utilities, which open up
the possibility of mixed strategies (probabilistic mixtures of actions, as opposed to specific actions). But util-
ities are notoriously difficult to measure and mixed strategies are often hard to interpret as ‘‘advice’’ [Kilgour
and Hipel, 2005].
The GMCR method was first put forward by Kilgour et al. [1987] based in part on earlier methods [Fraser and
Hipel, 1979; Howard, 1971]. In a 1993 book, Fang et al. [1993] explained in detail the GMCR methodology as
it existed at the time, included real-world applications, and provided a conflict analysis software system.
Later, the Decision Support System GMCR II [Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b] was designed to
permit a user to conveniently calibrate a graph model and thereby apply the GMCR methodology to small,
medium, and large conflicts.
Many scholars have improved and broadened the basic GMCR approach. For example, uncertain preference
[Li et al., 2004a; Yu et al., 2015a], multilevel strength of preference [Hamouda et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2009a],
and fuzzy preference [Hipel et al., 2011; Bashar et al., 2012] were introduced into GMCR to determine the
strategic impacts of preference uncertainty. Obeidi et al. [2005] showed how emotions can affect the prefer-
ence ranking while Inohara et al. [2007] defined stability concepts that take DMs’ attitudes into account.
Other extensions of the graph model framework include coalition analysis [Kilgour et al., 2001; Inohara and
Hipel, 2008a, 2008b], sensitivity analysis [Ma et al., 2011], status quo analysis [Li et al., 2004b], third-party
intervention [Kinsara et al., 2012], multistage conflict analysis [Toyota and Kijima, 2005], and policy stability
[Zeng et al., 2004, 2007]. Additional studies combine some of the above extensions, such as status quo anal-
ysis under uncertain preference [Li et al., 2005]. Finally, Xu et al. [2009b] provided a matrix method to speed
up the analysis of a graph model.
Compared to other formal conflict analysis methodologies such as game theory [Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1944], metagame analysis [Howard, 1971], conflict analysis [Fraser and Hipel, 1984], and drama theory
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[Howard, 1999], GMCR [Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993] holds many advantages. For instance, GMCR can
accept models with many DMs and any finite number of actions. It needs only DMs’ relative preference infor-
mation (which may be transitive or intransitive). It can model reversible, irreversible, and common moves
(more than one DM can make the same move). It provides a flexible framework to define, characterize, and
compare different stability concepts and is easy to apply to real-world conflicts. It provides a good under-
standing of how DMs should choose and gives strategic advice to both practitioners and researchers [see
Hipel, 2009a, 2009b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010 for summaries]. GMCR has been employed to analyze and resolve
various conflicts including water resources and environmental management conflicts [Li et al., 2004a, 2004b;
Gopalakrishnan et al., 2005; Madani and Hipel, 2007; Nandalal and Hipel, 2007; Elimam et al., 2008; Getirana and
Malta, 2010; Ma et al., 2011; Hipel and Walker, 2011; Hipel et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2013, 2015b].
The theories and methods of conflict analysis, first developed in the mid-1980s, have demonstrated the
capacity of analyzing the development and internal mechanisms of a conflict. However, the representation
of DMs who have special relationships, such as some forms of dependence, is limited. In the real world,
these dependencies are usually asymmetric, in which status levels and powers of subjects are different.
When a conflict outcome deviates from what a subject with power wants, the power owner may consider
using power to achieve a more favorable equilibrium. At the same time, other DMs must pay special atten-
tion to the actions of a DM with power.
The influence of asymmetric power has been the focus of many studies in supply chain management [Hunt
and Nevin, 1974; Lusch, 1976; Gaski, 1984]. Within the framework of non-cooperative game theory, De et al.
[1990] put forward a concept of hierarchical power which is similar to asymmetric power. Zeitoun and
Warner [2006] proposed the framework of hydro-hegemony for analyzing transboundary water conflicts by
studying and evaluating riparians’ geographical position (upstream/downstream), power (economic/politi-
cal/military/securitization), and resource exploitation potential (infrastructure/technology capacity). Zeitoun
[2007, 2008] explained how the asymmetric power relations between the two sides in the Palestinian-Israeli
water conflict results in the conflict being contained, but unresolved. In the seventh chapter of the book by
Dinar et al. [2007], the influence of relative power on international water conflict and cooperation is dis-
cussed. The existing literature on the hegemony and asymmetric power relations among riparians over
transboundary rivers also include contributions by Mirumachi and Allan [2007], Zeitoun and Mirumachi
[2008], Dinar [2009, 2012], Zeitoun et al. [2011], and Warner and Zawahri [2012].
Despite the prevalence of power asymmetry in conflicts, few scholars have considered the role of asymmet-
ric power in conflict analysis. In particular, power asymmetry is very common in water resources conflicts.
For instance, power asymmetry is a dominant natural feature of most river basins, where—in the absence
of basin wide markets or regulation—upstream-downstream conflicts are structurally asymmetric. Because
water resources conflicts are often complex decision problems, they are often solved by multilateral nego-
tiations, in which DMs can use power (political, military, economic, etc.) to affect the final outcome. Thus,
power asymmetry may be fundamental to the understanding and resolution of water resources disputes,
yet it is relatively unstudied in the water resources domain.
The objective of this research is to formally incorporate the concept of asymmetric power into the GMCR
framework. The underlying motivation was the need to address a challenging water pollution dispute in
China in which asymmetric power was a crucial factor. This study is the first attempt to develop the mathe-
matical formulation of power asymmetry within the GMCR framework. This technique can be applied to
many conflict resolution issues including water resources management but, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first water resources conflict study in which the asymmetric power has been explicitly considered
in the modeling process. In section 2, the basic idea of power in conflicts is described, followed by the pre-
sentation in section 3 of a new GMCR approach for formally investigating asymmetric power. The capability
of this new method for conveniently and realistically modeling asymmetric power is illustrated using the
water pollution dispute that took place along the Maxi Port River where it crosses the boarder of Jiangsu
and Zhejiang provinces in section 4. In the final section of the paper, some conclusions are drawn.
2. Power in Conflicts
As noted above, the concept of asymmetric power has been developed for the analysis of supply chain con-
flicts, focusing mainly on the relationships among power, conflict, and channel members’ satisfaction. Hunt
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and Nevin [1974] found that coercive power (punishment) reduces power receptors’ satisfaction (in contrast
to power owners), while noncoercive power (rewards) increases power receptors’ satisfaction; Lusch [1976]
claimed that coercive power intensifies conflict, while noncoercive power reduces it; and Gaski [1984] pro-
posed that the relationship of coercive or noncoercive power with conflict is closely related to whether the
power is exercised or not, respectively.
Within the water resources literature, some scholars have considered the power-asymmetric relations of
riparians along transboundary or international rivers, focusing mainly on the influence of the interactions
between the hegemonic states and the nonhegemonic states regarding conflict and cooperation. However,
researchers have reached different conclusions, for example, on the potential effects of hydro-hegemony
on cooperation [Zawahri et al., 2011]. Some argue that hegemons can use asymmetric power to achieve
coerced cooperation that confines the interest of nonhegemons [Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zeitoun et al.,
2011], while others suggest that hegemony can contribute to the public good by bringing about coopera-
tion [Zawahri and Mitchell, 2011].
All in all, power difference is an important factor affecting negotiation behavior and results in conflicts.
Clearly, power in a conflict is a ‘‘double-edged sword.’’ It can create more cooperation among DMs, perhaps
preventing or controlling the conflict. Conversely, power can escalate a conflict. Power must be important
in conflict analysis—so, before analyzing conflict using the idea of asymmetric power, the concept of power
must be defined carefully.
2.1. Definition of Power
It is widely agreed among sociologists that power can be essentially defined as the ability to influence
others. In order to further illuminate the nature of power, Emerson [1962] proposed that the power of A
over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A. Actually, these two definitions with differ-
ent starting points are not mutually exclusive. Combining them, one can define power as the potential or
ability of one party in the conflict to control or influence the behavior of another party, and this ability
depends on the degree of dependence between the two parties.
2.2. Classification of Power
The basic classification of power (coercive, reward, legitimate, referent, and expert) was first proposed by social
psychologists French and Raven [1959]. Later, this classification was widely adopted in supply chain studies. The
five kinds of power sources can be classified from different points of view, such as coercive versus noncoercive
power, economic versus noneconomic power, and exercised versus unexercised power [Gaski, 1984].
However, in order to make the concept of power useful to analyze general conflicts, not just specific channel
conflicts in supply chain management, direct and indirect power are defined in this research according to the
effect and cost of use. Direct power refers to power that can directly change or influence the target receptor’s
behavior, but that usually imposes some costs on the party exercising the power. Direct power can also be
divided into direct positive and direct negative power according to whether the power owner is exercising
incentive or punitive power on the power receptor. Indirect power is power that might change or influence the
receptor’s behavior, but is often costless to use. That is, indirect power might make a power receptor behave
submissively through changing the target’s subjective intention. Direct and indirect powers are different from
coercive versus noncoercive power, but are similar to exercised coercive versus exercised noncoercive power.
For instance, the United Nations or countries like the United States sometimes use sanctions to punish other
countries. These sanctions can be regarded as direct negative power. Saudi Arabia acted through reconcilia-
tion and monetary support to intervene in the conflict between Syria and Iraq [Kinsara et al., 2012]; the recon-
ciliation and monetary support can be regarded as indirect power and direct positive power, respectively. In
channel studies within supply chain management, coercive and legitimate power are forms of direct negative
power, reward is direct positive power, and indirect power includes referent and expert power.
In the Framework of Hydro-hegemony proposed by Zeitoun and Warner [2006], most of the water resource
control tactics that the powerful state would employ to exert power in riparian circumstances for leadership
or dominative outcomes can be classified into direct positive, direct negative, and indirect powers men-
tioned above. For example, trade incentives, diplomatic recognitions, and military protection are forms of
direct positive power; military action, economic sanctions, and political isolation belong to direct negative
power; and knowledge construction is an instance of indirect power.
Water Resources Research 10.1002/2014WR016257
YU ET AL. POWER ASYMMETRY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 8630
Overall, as an involuntary exogenous force on the target, the effect of direct power is obvious. Indirect
power mediates a conflict by changing the target’s sense of identification or approval of the power owner,
so if it works, it may have a long-term influence.
2.3. Perception of Power
Power itself influences the conflict only through perception or action. Therefore, the DMs’ evaluations of
their own and others’ potential powers are very important. In general, the greater the power, the stronger
the perception of it. Although the perception can more or less reflect the power itself, cognitive bias can
easily occur due to the subjectivity of the perception. However, in this paper, it is assumed that all DMs
have the correct perception of power, and hence, there are no errors on any side.
3. Conflict Modeling Under Power Asymmetry
The conflict analysis methodology provides a feasible approach for modeling, analyzing, and solving con-
flict problems. Generally, each subject or DM in the model has equal status and can act independently of
one another. However, for some conflicts, one DM has more power than others and can control the overall
situation by acting as a leader. In this case, many existing conflict analysis methods are no longer suitable.
Here the conflict analysis model with power asymmetry is established as follows.
3.1. Model Building
The key elements of a conflict graph model generally include the DMs, options (choices or actions), feasible
states (scenarios or outcomes), preferences, state transitions, and a set of directed graphs. The purpose of a
stability analysis based on a calibrated conflict model is to investigate potential moves and counter-moves
among DMs as they jockey for position according to their interests or value systems during the dynamic
process of reaching a possible resolution or equilibrium from which no DM has an incentive to deviate.
3.1.1. Decision Makers
DMs refer to the individuals or organizations involved in a given conflict who have the capability to make
decisions. Participants whose options and preferences are essentially the same can be regarded as one DM.
In the power-asymmetric conflict model considered in this paper, there are two levels in the power struc-
ture. The DM with greater power (also known as the higher decision maker (HDM)) is at a higher level or sta-
tus. Other DMs with less power (the lower decision makers (LDMs)) have lower status. Sometimes, an HDM
can influence or change an LDM’s behavior or preferences according to the HDM’s goals by invoking power.
DMs can be represented by the set N5 1; 2; . . . ; h; i; . . . ; n21; nf g, where DM h is the single HDM.
In the power-asymmetric conflict model defined below, it is assumed that each individual DM tries to satisfy
or maximize his own interests or objectives by making strategic decisions based on his own target values
and preferences among the possible scenarios in the full knowledge of how the other DMs could possibly
react. In addition, all DMs’ perceptions of power are considered as being correct. In other words, there is no
misunderstanding about power among the DMs.
3.1.2. Power and Options
Power refers to the HDM’s ability to change the conflict situation and to influence an LDM’s behavior. As
mentioned in section 2, an HDM can use two kinds of power: direct and indirect. Direct power falls into two
categories: positive and negative. Generally, direct power involves a cost when it is exercised, while indirect




s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12
LDM 1 o11 Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N
o12 N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
LDM 2 o21 Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
o22 N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
HDM o31 Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N
o32 N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N
o33 N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y
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power incurs no cost. Direct power directly changes at least one LDM’s preference, while indirect power
may make one or more LDMs behave submissively.
An effective way to define states is to use option form, which was originally proposed by Howard [1971] and
has been employed by other authors such as Fraser and Hipel [1984] and Fang et al. [1993]. Specifically, let Oi
denote DM i’s set of options, where oij is DM i’s jth option. The set of all options in a conflict is then O5[i2N
Oi in which the i index indicates who controls the options. The exercise of power is expressed and reflected
through the HDM’s power options. An HDM can use power by creating additional power options and thereby
changing one or more LDMs’ preferences. Assume there are three kinds of separated sets of power options
denoted by Od1 , Od-; and Od0, which represent direct positive, direct negative and indirect power, respec-
tively. The HDM’s set of all power options is given by Oph5Od1 [ Od- [ Od0. For example, the HDM’s ‘‘reward,’’
‘‘punish,’’ and ‘‘persuade’’ options, provided later in Table 12 and explained in section 4.3, constitute the direct
positive, direct negative, and ineffective indirect power options, respectively. In practice, the direct positive
and negative options are usually mutually exclusive since they cannot be used at the same time.
The situation in which HDM interacts with the LDMs using power or force is signaled by the letter p, while the
situation in which HDM uses no power is indicated by :p, where ‘‘:’’ means no. Assume that O:ph 5
oh1; oh2;    ; ohj;    ; ohm
 
is HDM’s set of options that do not include power, and Oph5
oh; m11; oh; m12;    ; oh; m1j;    ; oh; m1w
 
is HDM’s set of power options, where
oh; m1j 2 Od1 [ Od- [ Od0, for which Od1 [ Od- [ Od0 6¼ /. Notice that od0 2 Od0 might belong to O:ph , when
the HDM’s indirect power is ineffective and hence can be regarded as no power. Therefore, the HDM’s option




h when power can be invoked. The sets O
:p
h and
Oh might be the same when no power or only ineffective indirect power is available, but can differ (the num-
ber of options in Oh may be greater than in O
:p
h ) when direct power is available. The option set of a given
LDM, denoted by Oi , is the same whether or not HDM uses power, i.e., O
p
i 5/ and Oi5O
:p
i . Therefore, the set
of all options in a conflict model when the HDM can employ power is O5[i2N Oi .
3.1.3. Strategies and Feasible States
When a particular DM decides which of his options to select, a specific strategy is formed. A strategy for DM i is a
subset gi  Oi . Suppose DM i has an option oij 2 Oi , and g is an indicator function. If his strategy gi includes the
selection of oij , we say g oij
 
5Y; otherwise, g oij
 
5N. Thus, in the option form [Howard, 1971; Fraser and Hipel,
1979, 1984] of a conflict model such as that shown in Table 1, one can easily discover the reasons for the ‘‘Y’’s and
‘‘N’’s in the table. Take state s11 in Table 1 for example: LDM 1’s strategy is g15 g o11ð Þ5N; g o12ð Þ5Yf g, LDM 2’s
strategy is g25 g o21ð Þ5Y; g o22ð Þ5Nf g, and HDM’s strategy is g35 g o31ð Þ5N; g o32ð Þ5N; g o33ð Þ5Yf g.
The set of all subsets of Oi is the power set 2Oi , so a strategy for DM i is gi 2 2Oi . HDM’s strategies with no
power options, with power options, and with all options are g:ph 2 2O
:p
h , gph 2 2O
p
h , and gh 2 2Oh , respectively.
When each DM selects a strategy, a state, representing a specific situation or scenario in the conflict, is
Figure 1. Map of the conflict.
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formed. The set of all subsets of O5[i2N Oi is 2O, so a state is s 2 2O, and s can be written as
s5 g1; g2;    ; gi;    ; gnð Þ, where gi 2 2Oi .
In practice, some states (option combinations) are impossible or otherwise unattainable. These infeasible states
must be removed from the conflict model. For instance, sometimes a DM cannot choose two options at the
same time; hence, those states with both of the two mutually exclusive options selected are infeasible and
should be omitted. In addition, option combinations that are essentially equivalent or indistinguishable should
be coalesced and treated as a single state (also called an indistinguishable state) in a conflict model. A powerful
feature of GMCR II [Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b] is that it employs flexible procedures that can
remove all infeasible option combinations and coalesce all equivalent option combinations in any option form.
Figure 2. Basic integrated graph model.
Figure 3. Integrated power-asymmetric graph model.
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After the infeasible states are eliminated, what remains is the set of feasible states. Assume S is the set of
feasible states in a model when HDM’s power options are included. S:p5 s1; s2; . . . ; sk ; . . . ; st-1; stf g is
the set of states in which no power options are taken by HDM; it is also the set of all states when HDM has
no power. Let Sp5 st11; st12; . . . ; st1k ; . . . ; st1vf g (v  0) be the set of states in which HDM chooses at
least one power option. The number of feasible states can differ after the exercise of power by the HDM, so
v  0. It is obvious that S5S:p [ Sp.
As an example of the above definitions, consider a power-asymmetric conflict model shown in Table 1. The
left column in the table lists the three DMs, while the second column contains the options controlled by
each DM. Each of the numbered columns on the right-hand side in Table 1 represents a feasible state in the
conflict: a ‘‘Y’’ means yes, the option is selected by the DM controlling it; an ‘‘N’’ indicates an option is not
taken; and a dash (‘‘-’’) stands for Y or N. In Table 1, options o32 and o33 are HDM’s positive and negative
direct power options, respectively. In state s11, for example, HDM has selected option o33, while LDM 1 is
taking option o12, and LDM 2 chooses option o21.
Hence, S5 s1; s2; . . . ; s12f g is the set of all feasible states in the model given in Table 1. The set S:p5
s1; s2; s3; s4f g is the set of states where no power option is taken by HDM, and therefore Ns appear oppo-
site options o32 and o33 in each of these states. The set of power states Sp5 s5; s6; . . . ; s12f g is the set of
states in which at least one power option is taken by HDM.
3.1.4. Preferences
For each DM i 2 N, let i; if g represent DM i’s preferences on S, with the interpretation that ski st means
that DM i prefers state sk 2 S to state st 2 S, while ski st indicates that DM i has equal preference for these
two states, or is indifferent between them.
The influence of the power asymmetry on a DM’s preference can be considered from two perspectives.
First, a given LDM i’s preference for his own options might be changed when HDM chooses power options.
For the conflict in Table 1, for example, assume LDM 1 (also written as L1) prefers to choose option o11
rather than o12 (s1L1s3) when HDM does not exercise power (selects option o31) and LDM 2 chooses option
o21. But after HDM’s exercise of power (selecting option o32 or o33), LDM 1 may prefer to choose option o12
rather than o11 (s7L1s5 or s11L1s9). Second, HDM (also written as H) generally prefers to exercise negative
direct power more than positive direct power (o33 rather than o32) due to the former’s lower cost (s11Hs7).
An LDM (power receptor), however, may prefer that HDM exercise positive direct power (s7L1s11).
3.1.5. State Transitions
DM i’s reachable list or unilateral moves from state s5 g1; g2;    ; gnð Þ 2 S can be defined as:
Ri sð Þ5fq 2 S : q5 y1; y2;    ; ynð Þ; yj5gj for all j 2 N-i; yi 6¼ gig.
Because a DM may be tempted to unilaterally move to a
more preferred situation, the concept of a unilateral
improvement is important. In particular, DM i’s possible uni-
lateral improvements from state s 2 S are
R1i sð Þ5 q 2 Ri sð Þ and qi sf g.








A state is Nash stable for a DM if the DM






A state is GMR for a DM if all of the DM’s
unilateral improvements are sanctioned






A state is SMR for a DM if all of the DM’s
unilateral improvements are still sanctioned
by others, even after a possible response







A state is SEQ for a DM if all of the DM’s
unilateral improvements are sanctioned




Table 3. Basic Conflict Analysis Model
DMs Options s1 s2
LDM ol1 Y N
ol2 N Y
HDM oh1 Y Y
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The conflict in Table 1, for example, assumes that
HDM’s preferences over states s1, s5; and s9 are as
follows: s9Hs5Hs1. Then HDM’s reachable list or
unilateral moves from state s5 is RH sð Þ5 s1; s9f g,
and HDM’s possible unilateral improvements from
state s5 is R1H sð Þ5 s9f g.
3.1.6. Directed Graphs
For i 2 N, let Ai  S3S be the set of oriented arcs,
which represents the moves in one step controlled by DM i so that for sk ; st 2 S, sk ; stð Þ 2 Ai if and only if
(iff) st 2 Ri skð Þ. Then, Di5 S; Aið Þ is DM i’s directed graph when power options can be selected by HDM in
the model. Similarly, A:pi  S:p3S:p is the set of arcs controlled by DM i when power options are not avail-
able for HDM as is illustrated in Table 1. If sk ; st 2 S:p, then sk ; stð Þ 2 A:pi iff st 2 Ri skð Þ. The integrated
graph of all DMs is D5hS; fAigi2Ni when power options can be selected, and D:p5hS:p; fA
:p
i gi2Ni when
power options are not available. Note that one could also define a direct graph for the set of states Sp as Dp
5hSp; fApi gi2Ni when it is assumed that a power option is always chosen. For examples of directed graph
models, please see Figures 2 and 3.
3.1.7. Graph Model
The asymmetric power between DMs in the conflict often affects the HDM’s selection of power options and
at least one LDM’s preferences structure, and thus may change a DM’s preferences over the feasible states
and the results of the stability analysis. Therefore, the complete conflict analysis when power asymmetry is
considered can usually be divided into two stages: basic conflict analysis (for the set of states S:p) and
power-asymmetric conflict analysis (for the set of states S). Based on the above definitions, the basic conflict
analysis graph model is G:p5hN; S:p; fA:pi gi2N; fi; igi2Ni, while the power-asymmetric conflict analysis
graph model is G5hN; S; fAigi2N; fi; igi2Ni. In some situations, one may wish to carry out a stability
analysis of the power-based conflict model (for the set of states Sp) Gp5hN; Sp; fApi gi2N; fi; igi2Ni.
A variety of abstract game models are available for representing a conflict. Any form of the conflict model
puts the available information into perspective and systematically structures the problem [Fang et al., 1993].
The normal form [Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944], for example, is widely utilized in the classical game
theory, while the option form [Howard, 1971; Fraser and Hipel, 1979, 1984] has been employed in the study
of real-world conflicts. Both the normal form and the option form representations of games have some
drawbacks. Particularly, movements among states in either the normal or the option format are automati-
cally constrained by these special structures.
However, the graph form [Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993] is a more comprehensive and flexible repre-
sentation of conflicts. For instance, reachable lists are given to provide a complete, but simple and efficient,
description of the strategic structure of a conflict model. The option form and the normal form are symmet-
ric in the sense that if DM i can reach state st from state sk , then DM i can also reach state sk from state st .
But the graph form is not restricted by the symmetry assumption. The graph form can also model the possi-
bility of common moves, in which more than one DM can move from one state to another. The extra flexi-
bility to represent both irreversible moves and common moves constitutes an important advantage of the
graph form for modeling conflicts [Fang et al., 1993].
3.2. Stability Analysis
Employing the graph model methodology to analyze a strategic conflict usually comprises two steps: first,
conflict modeling, or specifying a graph having all the above mentioned elements, and second, conducting
stability analyses on the graph, as well as other extended analysis techniques such as status quo analysis [Li
et al., 2004b, 2005] and sensitivity analysis [Ma et al., 2011] if deemed appropriate.
For a graph model, a state is stable for a DM if the
DM would not choose to move away from it. A state
that is stable for all DMs is named an equilibrium.
Once one determines the set of feasible states, S:p,
in the basic conflict model; Sp, in the power-based
model; and S, in the power-asymmetric model; as
well as the preferences for each of the DMs among
Table 4. Direct Power-Asymmetric Conflict Analysis Model
DMs Options s1 s2 s3 s4
LDM ol1 Y N Y N
ol2 N Y N Y
HDM oh1 Y Y N N
oh2 N N Y Y
Table 5. Indirect Power-Asymmetric Conflict Analysis Model
DMs Options s1 s2 s5 s6
LDM ol1 Y N Y N
ol2 N Y N Y
HDM oh1 Y Y N N
oh3 N N Y Y
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the states for each of these three conflicts, a stability
analysis can be carried out separately for each of
these disputes to find the basic equilibria, power-
based equilibria and power-asymmetric equilibria,
respectively.
A solution concept defines mathematically how DMs
may behave under conflict. Four commonly used solu-
tion concepts, along with their descriptions and char-
acteristics regarding how they work, are provided in
Table 2. In the characterization, foresight refers to the maximum number of moves foreseen by a DM. Nash
stability looks one move ahead; both GMR and SEQ look two moves ahead, while SMR looks three moves
ahead. Disimprovement is a unilateral movement to a state which is less preferred than the current state by
a DM. A DM might be willing to sanction other DMs’ unilateral improvements by moving to a worse state.
No disimprovement exists for either the focal DM or other DMs in Nash stability and SEQ; in GMR and SMR,
sanctions by other DMs may be disimprovements. Stability definitions also differ with respect to levels of
preference knowledge: a DM only needs to know his own preferences in Nash stability, GMR, and SMR,
while the DM must know the preference information for all other DMs in SEQ.
The mathematical definitions of the above mentioned stability concepts are given as follows:
Nash: For i 2 N, state s 2 S is Nash stable for DM i, denoted by s 2 SNashi , if and only if (iff) R1i sð Þ5/.
GMR: For i 2 N, state s 2 S is GMR stable for DM i, denoted by s 2 SGMRi , iff for all s1 2 R1i sð Þ, there exists
s2 2 RN-i s1ð Þ, such that s‡is2.
SMR: For i 2 N, state s 2 S is SMR stable for DM i, denoted by s 2 SSMRi , iff for all s1 2 R1i sð Þ, there exists
s2 2 RN-i s1ð Þ, such that s‡is2, and s‡i s3 for all s3 2 Ri s2ð Þ.
SEQ: For i 2 N, state s 2 S is SEQ stable for DM i, denoted by s 2 SSEQi , iff for all s1 2 R1i sð Þ, there exists
s2 2 R1N-i s1ð Þ, such that s‡is2.
Since DMs in a conflict may have different levels of foresight, risk attitudes, and knowledge levels, selecting a
proper stability definition is a challenging task. When there is uncertainty about the characteristics of DMs, it is
helpful to carry out stability analysis under a range of stability concepts to see how the strategic behavior of DMs
reflects their capabilities and attitudes, and reveal how the conflict resolution depends on DMs’ behavior patterns.
The capability to accommodate different stability concepts is what makes GMCR flexible, and improves its validity.
One can employ the decision support system GMCR II [Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b] to calcu-
late stability according to each of the four solution concepts given in Table 2 for each of the DMs for every
state separately for any graph model, along with the associated equilibria. The preferences and stability
analysis for a dispute similar to that shown in Table 1 are provided in section 4 for a real-world water pollu-
tion conflict in China.
3.3. Two-Person Example
As mentioned earlier, an HDM can change an LDM’s preferences when direct power is used via the selection
of a direct power option. When an HDM levies indirect power by choosing an indirect power option, an
LDM’s preferences may be changed, though this is not necessarily the case. Three different models are now
used to illustrate how a two-person power-asymmetric conflict can be expressed within the framework of
GMCR, as well as how to identify if there is power asymmetry in a conflict.
In this two-person conflict, HDM’s option set with no power is O:ph 5 oh1f g, and is O
p
h5 oh2; oh3f g with
power, where option oh2 represents direct power and option oh3 stands for indirect power. LDM’s
option set is Ol5 ol1; ol2f g. Tables 3–5
show the basic conflict analysis model,
the direct power-asymmetric conflict
analysis model, and the indirect
power-asymmetric conflict analysis
model of the two-person conflict,
respectively.
Table 6. DMs, Options, and Feasible States of the Basic Graph
Model
DMs Options s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
JS 1. Retain Y Y N N -
2. Reduce N N Y Y -
3. Close N N N N Y
ZJ 4. Negotiate Y N Y N -
5. Block N Y N Y -
CG 6. Persuade Y Y Y Y -
Table 7. JS’s Preference Statements
Statements Descriptions
23 Do not choose ‘‘Close’’ to completely reduce and control the pollution
1 Select ‘‘Retain’’ to do nothing about the pollution
25 ZJ does not choose ‘‘Block’’ to escalate the conflict
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Assume that HDM always prefers that LDM
chooses option ol2. However, if HDM exercises
no power, and thereby chooses option oh1,
LDM prefers to select option ol1 (see Table 3).
But LDM is vulnerable to HDM’s power (options
oh2 and oh3). When HDM chooses option oh2
(exercises direct power), LDM prefers to select
option ol2 (see Table 4); when HDM chooses
option oh3 (exercises indirect power), LDM may
prefer to select option ol1 or ol2 (see Table 5).
When there is no power asymmetry in the two-person conflict, i.e., O:ph 5 oh1f g, S:p5 s1; s2f g, the basic con-
flict model is shown in Table 3. HDM’s preference order is s2hs1. LDM’s preference order is s1l s2. The
basic equilibrium, which is Nash stable for all the DMs, is found to be state s1 by conducting a stability anal-
ysis using GMCR II.
Table 4 shows how HDM exercises direct power by adding option oh2 on its own, where Oh5 oh1; oh2f g,
S5 s1; s2; s3; s4f g. HDM’s preference order is s2hs4hs1hs3. Because LDM’s preference order is
s1l s4l s3l s2, LDM is vulnerable to HDM’s power. Thus, the power-asymmetric equilibrium (Nash) is state s4.
When HDM uses indirect power (adding option oh3, see Table 5), Oh5 oh1; oh3f g, S5 s1; s2; s5; s6f g. In con-
trast to direct power, indirect power does not act directly, but through enhancing the LDM’s sense of identi-
fication or approval of the HDM, thus perhaps changing the LDM’s behavior. Indirect power usually does
not have a cost of use, but whether the power can change LDM’s behavior or not is uncertain. Therefore,
HDM’s preference order is s2hs6hs1hs5. But LDM’s preference is uncertain, and the uncertain preference
information is s1l s5 Ul s6ð Þls2, where the brackets indicate that LDM may prefer state s5 more than state
s6 or state s6 over state s5. The power-asymmetric equilibrium (Nash) would be state s1 or s6 depending on
whether s5ls6 or s6ls5, respectively. Therefore, indirect power is effective for HDM if s6l s5, but is ineffec-
tive if s5l s6.
The analysis demonstrates that to recognize whether there is power asymmetry in a conflict model the ana-
lyst should check whether one DM’s preference is vulnerable to an option of another DM. More specifically,
if one DM’s option can change another DM’s preference, this option can be regarded as direct power or
effective indirect power; if one DM’s option can make another DM’s preference be uncertain, this option
can be regarded as indirect power.
4. Application to a Water Pollution Conflict
A useful case study illustrating the applicability of this paper’s conflict analysis model is a well-known water
pollution conflict between China’s Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces. Although this conflict has also been
studied and analyzed using GMCR [Yu et al., 2013], the effect of asymmetric power was not considered in
their study. The real-life case in this section is more of a water quality conflict at the regional level, but we
believe that the afore-established power asymmetric conflict analysis model can be employed to analyze
other kinds of water conflicts at both the regional and international levels. Meanwhile, because water con-
flicts typically involve many decisions and these are the result of many different factors affecting DMs, to
reduce a conflict to a model having only a few DMs with a certain number of options removes unnecessary
complexity at the expense of having a less exact representation of reality. However, this does not necessar-
ily mean the model is ineffective, since nearly all kinds of modeling methodologies attempt to represent
real-world cases as simply as possible for




In China, Maxi Port is a small river located
at the boundary of Shengze Town (in Suz-
hou City, Jiangsu Province) and
Table 8. ZJ’s Preference Statements
Statements Descriptions
3 JS chooses ‘‘Close’’ to completely reduce and control
the pollution
2 JS selects ‘‘Reduce’’ to partially reduce and control the
pollution
4 IF 2 Select ‘‘Negotiate’’ if JS chooses ‘‘Reduce’’ to partially
control the pollution
5 IF 1 Select ‘‘Block’’ to escalate the conflict if JS chooses
‘‘Retain’’ to do nothing about the pollution
Table 9. CG’s Preference Statements
Statements Descriptions
3 JS chooses ‘‘Close’’ to completely reduce and control
the pollution
2 JS selects ‘‘Reduce’’ to partially reduce and control
the pollution
25 ZJ does not choose ‘‘Block’’ to escalate the conflict
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Wangjiangjing Town (in Jiaxing City, Zhejiang Province). As
shown in Figure 1, the river flows from Shengze Town to the
northern part of Jiaxing City. The 27 large dyeing and printing
enterprises in Shengze Town produce large quantities of pollu-
tion, releasing about 100,000 tons of untreated industrial waste-
water into Maxi Port on a daily basis, causing serious water
pollution in the northern areas of Jiaxing City. In the late 1980s,
the water quality of the Maxi Port was found to be Class III, which reflects middle level of water pollution. In
the 1990s, it rapidly deteriorated, reaching Class IV in 1992, and Class V in 1996. The health and quality of
life of many people were seriously endangered by this pollution. According to the available statistics, in the
1990s, the pollution cost the fisheries of Jiaxing City a cumulative loss of 50 million yuan; 150,000 people
were directly affected; the drinking water of 800,000 people was polluted; and many had to obtain drinking
water from 5 km away. During the 1990s, disputes frequently arose at the border of Jiangsu and Zhejiang,
and the problem was never properly resolved. Under the coordination of the Taihu Basin Administration
(TBA), which is led by both the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) and the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA) of China, Jiaxing negotiated with Suzhou many times, but failed to reach an agree-
ment. Eventually, on 22 November 2001, a hostile event occurred.
That night, a crowd of people from Jiaxing, using four bulldozers, sank 28 concrete boats full of thousands
of sand bags at Maxi Port, thereby blocking industrial wastewater released into the Maxi River from reach-
ing the northern part of Jiaxing City. This action was paid for by citizens from Jiaxing, who self-raised over 1
million yuan. The event attracted the attention of the Central Government (CG) of China, which then
ordered and authorized the TBA to coordinate and solve the conflict properly, and as soon as possible.
Under the permission and instructions of CG, the TBA received the right (or power) to support or punish
Suzhou. Finally, through the CG’s coordination, Jiangsu and Zhejiang conducted a formal negotiation,
resulting in an agreement jointly signed by the two provinces, the MWR and the SEPA. Under this agree-
ment, Suzhou had to reduce its pollution emissions to less than 40% of the original, and subsequently, Zhe-
jiang removed the blockage. The water pollution conflict had been effectively solved.
4.1.2. Decision Makers and Options
The first step of a conflict analysis is to recognize the relevant DMs. As explained earlier, the water pollution con-
flict involves Suzhou City, Jiaxing City and the TBA, which individually fall under the control of Jiangsu (JS) Prov-
ince, Zhejiang (ZJ) Province and CG, respectively. Therefore, the three DMs in the conflict are the upstream region
located in JS, the downstream region in ZJ, and the coordinator, which is CG. The two provinces are in the same
administrative positions and therefore have equal power, while the CG occupies a superior administrative position
and has more power. According to the foregoing definitions, JS and ZJ are the LDMs, while CG acts as the HDM.
In addition to the DMs’ identities, their options need to be known as well. Specifically, JS has three available options
under its control: ‘‘Retain’’: Retain the status quo by keeping the existing economic growth mode and the current pol-
lution controls; ‘‘Reduce’’: Increase the intensity of pollution control to reduce the pollution levels; ‘‘Close’’: Shut down
the polluting industries to completely eliminate their emissions. There are two options for ZJ: ‘‘Negotiate’’: Through
negotiations, determine the reduction in pollution released by JS; ‘‘Block’’: Via coercive action taken by its citizens, try
to force JS to reduce its pollution.
Before 22 November 2001, TBA, as the representative of CG, had only one option: ‘‘Persuade’’: Act as a coor-
dinator to persuade JS to reduce its pollution. After this date, under the instructions and authorization of
CG, TBA had two additional options: ‘‘Reward’’: Use direct positive power to encourage JS to reduce its pol-
lution by using an incentive compensation policy. That is, if JS does well in reducing the pollution, CG will
provide capital or technological support to JS; ‘‘Punish’’: Use direct negative power to force JS to reduce the
pollution by using a punitive policy. That is, water quality stand-
ards are set in certain sections of the river, and JS is punished if
the water quality is substandard. CG tends to use its direct neg-
ative power due to its lower associated cost. In this case, the
option of ‘‘Persuade’’ can also be regarded as ineffective indi-
rect power.
As mentioned, the power asymmetry between the two classes
of DMs can influence the equilibrium results of a conflict
Table 10. Preference Information
DMs Preference Rankings
JS s1  s2  s3  s4  s5
ZJ s5  s3  s4  s2  s1
CG s5  s3  s4  s1  s2






Water Resources Research 10.1002/2014WR016257
YU ET AL. POWER ASYMMETRY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 8638
analysis. This influence can be clearly determined by conducting a basic conflict analysis, as in section 4.2,
as well as a power-asymmetric conflict analysis, as in section 4.3.
4.2. Basic Conflict Analysis
Because the DMs had equal powers at the time this conflict started before 22 November 2001 when the
river was blocked, a basic conflict analysis approach is used. The option form is shown in Table 6 for the
water pollution conflict. Notice that in Table 6, CG had the single option of ‘‘Persuade’’ before 22 November
2001. After the river was blocked, CG’s options increased, as explained in the analysis of the conflict using a
power-asymmetric graph model in section 4.3.
4.2.1. Feasible States
Because each option can either be selected or not, there are a total of 26 5 64 mathematically possible
states. However, when the infeasible states that cannot possibly occur in the real world are removed and
states that are essentially the same are combined into state s5, the five feasible states displayed on the right
in Table 6 remain.
In state s2, for example, JS has selected the option ‘‘Retain’’ in which it does nothing, ZJ has decided to
‘‘Block’’ the Maxi Port, and CG is taking the option ‘‘Persuade,’’ for which it is encouraging JS and ZJ to coop-
erate. Under state s5, JS has chosen to ‘‘Close’’ the dying industries, and therefore it does not matter
whether other options are taken or not, as represented by the dashes – the conflict is solved.
Figure 2 displays the integrated graph model of the basic conflict for which the moves controlled by a given
DM are indicated by the type of line that is drawn. The circles represent the feasible states. The directed
arcs represent the transitions between states under the control of the corresponding DM. The arc tails rep-
resent the initial states, and the arrowheads represent the reachable states which can be attained from the
initial states. Notice that ZJ, for example, can cause the conflict to move from state s1 to state s2 by chang-
ing its option selection from ‘‘Negotiate’’ to ‘‘Block,’’ as indicated in states s1 and s2 in Table 6 for which the
option selections of the other two DMs remain fixed.
4.2.2. Preferences
Three flexible approaches (option weighting, option prioritization, and direct ranking) are available in
GMCR II for conveniently specifying preference information in terms of options for each DM. In this article,
option prioritization is utilized for the ranking of states for each DM. This approach furnishes an intuitive
specification based on preference statements explained in terms of option numbers listed from the most
important at the top to least important at the bottom. Tables 7–9 contain explanations of the preference
statements for JS, JZ, and CG, respectively. For example, as shown at the top of Table 9 on the left, the
most important preference statement
for CG is that JS chooses ‘‘Close’’ by
selecting option 3 in order to com-
pletely reduce and control the pollu-
tion. A negative sign beside an option,
such as ‘‘25’’ in Table 9, indicates that
CG prefers that ZJ not choose option 5.
Notice, as shown at the bottom of
Table 8, that a DM can use conditional
preference statements. In this case the
least preferred statement for ZJ is that
Table 12. DMs, Options, and Feasible States of the Power-Asymmetric Graph Model
DMs Options s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13
JS 1. Retain Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N -
2. Reduce N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y -
3. Close N N N N N N N N N N N N Y
ZJ 4. Negotiate Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N -
5. Block N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y -
CG 6. Persuade Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N -
7. Reward N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N -
8. Punish N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y -
Table 13. JS’s Preference Statements
Statements Descriptions
23 JS does not choose ‘‘Close’’ to completely reduce
and control the pollution
6 CG selects ‘‘Persuade’’ to coordinate the conflict
1 IF 6 JS prefers to choose ‘‘Retain’’ if CG selects ‘‘Persuade’’
2 IF 7|8 JS prefers to choose ‘‘Reduce’’ if CG selects
‘‘Reward’’ or ‘‘Punish’’
7 CG selects ‘‘Reward’’ to coordinate the conflict
25 ZJ does not select ‘‘Block’’ to intensify the conflict
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this DM prefers to choose ‘‘Block’’
(option 5) if JS selects ‘‘Retain’’
(option 1). In fact, the preference
statements obey the rules of what is
called first-order logic.
After all of the hierarchical prefer-
ence statements are entered, and
assuming that the preferences are
transitive, GMCR II generates and
displays the state rankings for each
DM in which the states are ordered from most preferred on the left to least preferred on the right, where
ties are allowed. Table 10 presents the ranking of states for each DM, where in the top row ‘‘s1  s5’’ means
that JS prefers state s1 over state s5 and the other listed states. As shown in Table 10, for JS, ‘‘Retain’’ is the
most preferred option, while ‘‘Close’’ is the least preferred option. State s5 is the most preferred state for
both ZJ and CG. Because of the preference statement ‘‘5 IF 1’’ at the bottom of Table 8, notice that state s2
is preferred over state s1 for ZJ in Table 10. From the ordering of states for ZJ in Table 10, one can see that
state s3 is preferred to state s4 because ZJ prefers to ‘‘Negotiate’’ over ‘‘Reduce,’’ which is implied by the
preference statement ‘‘4 IF 2’’ in Table 8. CG hopes that the conflict can be solved, and that ZJ does not
choose ‘‘Block.’’
4.2.3. Stability Analysis
The stability analysis is conducted using GMCR II. The analysis results are as shown in Table 11, where state
s2 and state s5 are the equilibria in the basic conflict analysis. State s2, the existing reality, represents that
the conflict broke out and TBA’s coordination did not work. State s5, which did not occur in reality, shows
an indistinguishable state when JS chooses ‘‘Close.’’
4.3. Power-Asymmetric Conflict Analysis
The event on 22 November 2001 drew great attention from CG, who then gave certain rights to the TBA to
coordinate and solve the conflict. Thus, TBA had two more options: ‘‘Reward’’ and ‘‘Punish.’’ In the model, as
the power between the DMs becomes asymmetric, the aforementioned power-asymmetric conflict analysis
should be conducted. Options ‘‘Reward’’ and ‘‘Punish’’ reflect the direct positive power and the direct nega-
tive power of the HDM (CG), respectively.
4.3.1. Feasible States
From a logical point of view, 28 5 256 states will be produced by three DMs from a total of eight options.
However, each DM must choose at least and at most one option at one time. State s13 is an indistinguish-
able state. After the infeasible states are eliminated, the feasible states are as shown in Table 12. The inte-
grated graph model is depicted in Figure 3.
4.3.2. Preferences
Tables 13–15 furnish an explanation of the preference statements for JS, JZ, and CG, respectively. By
comparing the preference statements in the basic conflict analysis, it is obvious that under power asym-
metry, JS’s preference is changed by CG’s power, as is reflected by the statements ‘‘1 IF 6’’ and ‘‘2 IF 7|8’’
in Table 13. The preference statements of JZ and CG in Tables 14 and 15 are basically the same as those
in Tables 8 and 9, respectively. Between the two new additional options of CG (options 7 and 8), option
8 (‘‘Punish’’) is preferred by both ZJ and CG to option 7 (‘‘Reward’’), because direct negative power (‘‘Pun-
ish’’) usually has a lower cost of use and higher effectiveness than direct positive power (‘‘Reward’’). This
is also why JS prefers CG not to use any powers, and why between ‘‘Reward’’ and ‘‘Punish,’’ JS prefers the
former.
After all of the hierarchical prefer-
ence statements are entered, and
assuming that the preferences are
transitive, GMCR II generates and
displays the state rankings for each
DM. Table 16 presents the ranking
of states for each DM. The states
are ordered with the most
Table 14. ZJ’s Preference Statements
Statements Descriptions
3 JS chooses ‘‘Close’’ to completely reduce and control the pollution
2 JS selects ‘‘Reduce’’ to partially reduce and control the pollution
4 IF 2 ZJ chooses ‘‘Negotiate’’ to cooperate with JS if JS chooses
‘‘Reduce’’ to partially reduce and control the pollution
5 IF 1 ZJ selects ‘‘Block’’ to intensify the conflict if JS chooses
‘‘Retain’’ to do nothing about the pollution
8 CG chooses ‘‘Punish’’ to coordinate the conflict
7 CG selects ‘‘Reward’’ to coordinate the conflict
Table 15. CG’s Preference Statements
Statements Descriptions
3 JS chooses ‘‘Close’’ to completely reduce and control the pollution
2 JS selects ‘‘Reduce’’ to partially reduce and control the pollution
25 ZJ does not choose ‘‘Block’’ to intensify the conflict
8 CG selects ‘‘Punish’’ to coordinate the conflict
7 CG chooses ‘‘Reward’’ to coordinate the conflict
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preferred on the left to least preferred on
the right, where ties are allowed.
4.3.3. Stability Analysis
The stability analysis is conducted using
GMCR II to produce the results shown in
Table 17. States s11 and s13, the equilibria,
are strongly stable. State s13 (the same as
state s5 in the basic conflict analysis) is the equilibrium, which did not happen in reality. State s11, as the final
resolution which took place in reality after CG exercised its direct negative power, is also called the power-
asymmetric equilibrium according to the foregoing definitions. States s3, s4, s7, s8, and s12 are weakly stable.
The actual trajectory of the water pollution conflict from the status quo (state s1) via intermediary states to
the final equilibrium (state s11) is shown in Table 18. The arrows in the table show how the conflict devel-
oped. For instance, the conflict can be transferred from state s1 to state s2 through ZJ changing his option
from ‘‘Negotiate’’ to ‘‘Block.’’ It can be seen that the above analysis is clearly consistent with the actual trajec-
tory of the conflict, which verifies the feasibility and applicability of the conflict analysis model under the
power asymmetry established in this paper.
In the trans-boundary water pollution conflict, the local governments (JS and ZJ), who only consider their
own benefits and ignore the overall interests of the river basin, are at the same administrative level, so it is
hard for them to cooperate to jointly control the pollution. Therefore, a coordinator is necessary to encour-
age JS and ZJ to cooperate. However, TBA, as the coordinator in this conflict, lacked the authority and
means to influence the local governments before 22 November 2001, which meant the dispute could not
be effectively solved, and thereby caused the ‘‘block dam’’ event. This incident forced CG to pay attention
to the conflict and then authorize TBA to have certain powers to coordinate and solve the conflict. Eventu-
ally, through the effects of CG’s punitive policy, the conflict was effectively solved. The success of the coor-
dination in this conflict provides important reference value for conflicts like this.
Actually, this conflict was analyzed using GMCR in [Yu et al., 2013], but the influence of power asymmetry
was not considered, resulting in a conflict model that is less consistent with reality than the one in this
paper. For instance, in the conflict model established in [Yu et al., 2013], only two options of CG (‘‘Reward’’
and ‘‘Punish’’) are considered; the infeasible states when CG selects both ‘‘Reward’’ and ‘‘Punish’’ are not
deleted; the indistinguishable states when JS chooses ‘‘Close’’ are not combined; and the model includes
eighteen feasible states. As well, because CG is not regarded as a DM with higher power than JS and ZJ,
CG’s options ‘‘Reward’’ and ‘‘Punish’’ are not considered as positive and negative power. Assuming symmet-
ric roles for the DMs means that some important strategic insights are missed in that paper.
However, the conflict analysis model with power asymmetry established in this paper was used to analyze the
water pollution conflict both before and after the use of power by the coordinator, yielding different out-
comes. Specifically, state s2 (in which the conflict is not resolved effectively) is an equilibrium of the conflict
before the use of power by CG, while state s11 (where it is resolved) is the equilibrium after CG uses its power.
The analysis makes clear the effects of CG’s power to change the option selections and preferences of other
DMs, and therefore the final outcome of the conflict. This analysis provides a better understanding of the evo-
lution of the conflict, producing significant strategic insights for both practitioners and researchers. For
instance, comparison of the basic analysis and the power-asymmetric analysis of this conflict shows that CG’s
expected goals and use of power have a significant impact on the development and the equilibria of the
model and thus on the cooperation of JS and ZJ. The key to understanding this and similar conflicts is to take
into account the coordinator’s strategy or power. Note that the above mentioned strategic insights cannot be
achieved using only the earlier analysis in [Yu et al., 2013].
5. Conclusions
Asymmetrical power relationships are
typical of many conflict interactions.
However, most research in game
theory and conflict analysis assumes
symmetrical roles for the DMs, which
Table 16. Preference Information
DMs Preference Rankings
JS s1  s2  s3  s4  s7  s8  s11  s12  s5  s6  s9  s10  s13
ZJ s13  s11  s7  s3  s12  s8  s4  s10  s6  s2  s9  s5  s1
CG s13  s11  s7  s3  s12  s8  s4  s9  s5  s1  s10  s6  s2
Table 17. Stability Analysis Results
Stability s3 s4 s7 s8 s11 s12 s13
Nash  
GMR       
SMR       
SEQ  
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means that some strategic insights
must inevitably be missing. Here within
the framework of GMCR, the authors
have developed a formal procedure for
modeling the strategic influence of
power asymmetry in a conflict. First, a
graph model under power asymmetry is
established, so that any shift in stability
or equilibrium becomes clear in a
power-asymmetric situation. Then a
water pollution conflict is investigated
using the new model. The analysis of this case study demonstrates the feasibility and the applicabil-
ity of the model.
Employing a power-asymmetric model can make a predicted resolution more realistic. Simply put, if there is
power asymmetry in a real-world conflict, then only a power-asymmetric model can reflect the interactive
decision process. Using a better model should improve predictions, and provide strategic insights into the
conflict. As the application showed, many water resources planning and management problems with multi-
ple agents can benefit from the proposed methodology in the paper, because many agents have asymmet-
ric status or powers.
As an abstract concept, power is difficult to measure. The exercise and the effect of power are difficult to
express mathematically. However, the authors believe that DMs’ powers are generally represented by one
of the three kinds of specific options (direct positive, direct negative, and indirect power options) according
to the three types of powers (direct positive, direct negative, and indirect powers) defined here. Moreover,
the exercise of power is expressed through HDM’s additional power options, which can change at least one
LDM’s preferences. The foregoing paradigm for expressing and ascertaining power asymmetry is mathe-
matically incorporated into the framework of GMCR in this paper. The conclusions that can be drawn from
this paper are as follows:
1. Generally, two steps exist in analyzing power asymmetry in conflicts. The first is to model and under-
stand the conflict using a basic conflict analysis. The second is to determine how an HDM causes a basic
equilibrium to become a power-asymmetric equilibrium by using power to control the environment and
thereby change the conflict outcome.
2. The analysis approach proposed here in this paper is suitable for analyzing n-person conflicts with power
asymmetry. It focuses on the HDM’s ability to change other DMs’ option selections and preferences,
clearly showing the effects of powers.
3. The HDM’s views and behavior have a significant impact on the outcome of a conflict. In a power-
asymmetric conflict, the HDM is in the dominant position and can control an LDM to some extent. The
development trend and the equilibrium solution of the conflict depend on the HDM’s expected goals
and use of power.
4. Asymmetric power is sometimes helpful for the resolution of conflicts, especially those regarding the use
or allocation of a natural resource such as water, or assigning responsibility for remediation, such as
treating polluted water. In such conflicts, a coordinator must usually be responsible for participating in
and coordinating the mediation. If the coordinator does not have more power, or a higher position, than
other DMs, the mediation may not be effective.
5. There is good reason to expect that most third-party-intervention conflicts [Zawahri, 2009b; Kinsara et al.,
2012] can be investigated using the power-asymmetric analysis model developed here, because nearly
all the strategies that mediators can undertake can be classified into direct positive or negative powers
and indirect powers.
6. Different kinds of power usually have different costs of use and achieve different effects. In addition, the
use of indirect power can cause uncertainty, in that it may not work. Generally, the use of direct power
can turn uncertain preferences into strict preferences.
All in all, this research indicates that power asymmetry has both theoretical and empirical value in conflict
analysis. More insights can be obtained with respect to the evolution of a conflict by studying asymmetric
power in detail. Because it is strategically dynamic, asymmetric power can delineate a path from non-
Table 18. Actual Trajectory of the Water Pollution Conflict
DM Option Status Quo Intermediary States Equilibrium
JS Retain Y Y Y N N
Reduce N N N Y Y
Close N N N N N
ZJ Negotiate Y N N N Y
Block N Y Y Y N
CG Persuade Y Y N N N
Reward N N N N N
Punish N N Y Y Y
Label s1 s2 s10 s12 s11
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cooperative behavior to cooperative behavior in certain intractable conflicts. This insight can assist DMs in
making strategic decisions. However, the power-asymmetric conflict model established in this research pos-
sesses only two levels of power structure and only one HDM is considered in the model. Thus, it is desirable
to extend the hierarchical asymmetric power model to include more than one HDM.
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